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BUCKLEY V. VALEO, POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
 
by 
 
Trevor Potter* 
 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman. 
-- Buckley v. Valeo1 
 
Don't underestimate the common man.  People are intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. . . .  They can evaluate its 
anonymity along with its message . . . .  [O]nce they have done so, it is for them 
to decide what is responsible, what is valuable, and what is truth. 
 
-- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission2 
 
Political disclosure laws have a mixed constitutional record in Supreme 
Court First Amendment jurisprudence.  Generally, disclosure enjoys a favored 
position, and is said by the Supreme Court to advance, rather than restrict, the 
information available in the marketplace of ideas.  On the other hand, 
compelled disclosure has been held in some cases to have a chilling effect on 
political speech, and to constitute an impermissible abridgment of free speech.  
 
Disclosure’s constitutional status is more relevant than ever.  From a 
policy standpoint, the importance of the prompt disclosure of campaign finance 
data and other political information has emerged as one of the few areas of 
consensus among those favoring both greater and lesser regulation of political 
                                                 
* Trevor Potter, was a Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission from 1991 to 
1995, and Chairman of the FEC in 1994.  He has served as the Merrill Lecturer at the 
University of Virginia School of Law, and as Chair of the American Bar Association’s 
Election Law Committee of the Administrative Law Section.  He is partner in the 
Washington, D.C. law firm of Wiley, Rein and Fielding, and a Senior Fellow in 
Government Studies at the Brookings Institution. 
Significant research and editorial assistance with this article was provided by 
Daniel Manatt of the Brookings Institution Campaign Finance Reform Sourcebook 
project, and by Allison Hayward and Kirk Jowers, associates of the law firm Wiley 
Rein, & Fielding. 
1 424 U.S. 1, 67 n.80 (1976) (quoting L. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S  MONEY 62) (Nat’l 
Home Library Found. ed. 1933). 
2 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995) (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d. 978, 996 
(1974)). 
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finance.3  This consensus dissipates, however, when the specifics of disclosure 
proposals are discussed.  Is it constitutionally permissible to require disclosure 
of the financing of issue advocacy advertisements when they refer to specific 
candidates or elections?  Here, the combatants disagree, with those in favor of 
disclosure saying that the Supreme Court would uphold such requirements 
(citing Buckley v. Valeo)4 and those opposed to issue advocacy disclosure 
arguing that it is akin to the Ohio disclosure requirement on anonymous 
leafletters declared unconstitutional by the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission.5 
 
Put differently, the reality is that disclosure’s constitutional status is 
unclear.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudential framework is often 
unpredictable.  Even when the Court has been consistent in choosing a formal 
framework with which to approach disclosure laws, it has been inconsistent and 
unpredictable in applying that framework.  To be sure, this issue takes on 
particular urgency in light of the importance both sides in the campaign finance 
debate attach to disclosure of campaign spending (however differently 
defined), and the existence of the Internet as a vehicle for immediate mass 
dissemination of information required to be reported.  Accordingly, providing an 
overview of the Supreme Court’s disclosure jurisprudence under the First 
Amendment (as it has been applied in several contexts: candidate elections; 
candidate-specific issue advocacy; ballot initiative or referenda campaigns; and 
broadcast political advertising), this article then examines disclosure 
requirements applicable to lobbyists, foreign agents, government officials, and 
parties or witnesses in litigation or legislative investigations.  It concludes by 
examining what common strains emerge from these disparate cases, and thus 
what new approaches are most likely to withstand constitutional review. 
 
I.  BUCKLEY AND DISCLOSURE UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
 
Buckley v. Valeo6 established the campaign and political disclosure 
framework for campaign finance jurisprudence. In Buckley, the Court upheld all 
                                                 
3See, e.g., H.R. 965, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)(The Doolittle Bill); H.R. 3582, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998)(The revised Shays-Meehan Bill ).  See generally 144 
CONG REC. (daily ed., March 30, 1998) (debate on Campaign Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1998).  Campaign finance experts favoring a deregulation approach nonetheless 
favor disclosure, (see, e.g., LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE 
SECRETS 230 (1996) as do pro-regulation reformers (see, e.g., Center for Responsive 
Politics, Plugging In the Public: A Model for Campaign Finance Disclosure (1996)). 
4 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  See discussion, infra. 
5 514 U.S. at 357.  
6 424 U.S. 1. 
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of the disclosure provisions reviewed by the Court, while presaging later 
decisions which would qualify that holding.  More importantly, it constructed the 
analytical framework which still guides the court over 20 years later. 
 
The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), enacted in 1971 and 
1974, laid out a comprehensive system of federal campaign finance 
regulations.7  The disclosure provisions required political committees, political 
parties and candidates to register with the Federal Election Commission, and to 
disclose the identity of contributors and the dollar amount of their contributions, 
as well as the size and recipients of their expenditures or disbursements.  It 
also required individuals and groups other than political committees or 
candidates to report independent expenditures over $100 to the FEC.8 
 
In reviewing FECA’s disclosure provisions, the Supreme Court in 
Buckley had little precedent to guide it.  The one previous Supreme Court case 
reviewing federal election disclosure requirements was Burroughs v. United 
States,9 which reviewed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the first 
federal campaign finance disclosure law.10 Burroughs included no First 
Amendment analysis, and applied deferential scrutiny, stating that Congress 
had broad power to regulate federal elections to combat corruption.11 
 
Buckley, drawing more on the 1958 case NAACP v. Alabama12 than 
Burroughs, found that “compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on 
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.”13  
Consequently, the Court applied “exacting scrutiny.”  Under this intermediate 
scrutiny standard, the government would have to state an important state 
interest.  Moreover, as the Court said, “we also have insisted that there be a 
‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the government interest 
and the information required to be disclosed.”14   
                                                 
7 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. 
8 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1974). 
9 Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
10 43 Stat. 1070. 
11 Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547. 
12 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
13 Buckley,  424 U.S. at 64. 
14 Id. In Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449, the state’s interest in disclosure of rank-and-file 
membership was held not to have a close correlation to Alabama’s state interest in 
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Under the disclosure framework it had laid out, the Court recognized 
three state interests justifying disclosure.  First, it noted mandatory disclosure 
diminishes both actual and apparent corruption.  Exposing large contributions 
to the public discourages contributors and politicians from using money for 
improper purposes both before and after elections, and also enables voters to 
detect post-election favors.  A second, related interest was detecting violations 
of the Act's contribution limits.15  Third, the Court also recognized that 
disclosure better enables the public to evaluate candidates and “to place more 
precisely each candidate along the political spectrum.”16 Additionally, 
knowledge of a candidate's financial sources permits voters to predict future 
performance in office by identifying the interests to which a candidate is most 
likely to be responsive.17  
 
Furthermore, in recognizing that government has legitimate interests in 
requiring disclosure, the appellants in Buckley argued that the disclosure 
provisions should not apply to minor parties on the grounds that disclosure 
would expose them to harassment and abuse.  To address this “speech-
chilling” argument, the Buckley Court drew on NAACP v. Alabama.18  In that 
case, Alabama brought suit to bar the NAACP from operating in Alabama due 
to the organization’s failure to comply with the state’s foreign corporations 
registration act.  As part of the litigation, the state sought extensive disclosure 
of  NAACP records, including a complete list of all NAACP members in the 
state, asserting them as necessary to prove that the NAACP engaged in 
“intrastate business” activities in Alabama.   
 
The NAACP appealed the court order to comply with the discovery 
orders, and the Supreme Court unanimously blocked the disclosure, stating 
that the state interest – proving the NAACP was engaged in business – and its 
correlation to subpoenaing membership lists were not well demonstrated.  By 
contrast, the Court found the NAACP showed it would sustain substantial injury 
from disclosure.  Crucially, the NAACP demonstrated a particularized showing 
that its rank-and-file members would suffer reprisal should their membership be 
revealed:  “[R]evelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has 
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
                                                                                                                         
regulating intra-state commerce.  Thus, unlike many subsequent disclosure cases, 
NAACP v. Alabama truly did apply the intermediate scrutiny standard.   Id.  
15 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 68. 
18 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
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physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”19  The Court 
also stressed that the NAACP had substantially complied with the state’s 
registration laws and was objecting only to disclosure of “ordinary rank-and-file 
members.”20 
 
Using the NAACP framework, Buckley, while upholding the disclosure 
requirements as applied to minor parties, said that such parties could get an 
exemption if they could present specific evidence of hostility, threats, 
harassment, and reprisals against members or the organization itself.21   
 
Notably, the Court applied the minor party exemption a few years later, 
in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee.22 The Court held that 
the Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") need not make public financial disclosures 
because it had shown "a reasonable probability that disclosure of the names of 
contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals 
from either Government officials or private parties."23  SWP met the test by 
showing that members had been subjected to threatening phone calls, hate 
mail, destruction of their property, police harassment of a candidate, the firing 
of shots at an SWP office, and the dismissal of several party members from 
their jobs because of their membership. Similarly, FBI surveillance of the party 
and its dissemination of information designed to injure the SWP’s ability to 
function constituted government harassment of the type contemplated by 
Buckley.24 
 
Socialist Workers therefore illustrates Buckley's observation that 
disclosure laws could, in some instances, be unconstitutional as applied to 
independent and minor parties, but that parties claiming an unconstitutional 
application face the burden of showing specific and concrete examples of 
retaliation for their activities.25 
                                                 
19 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462. 
20 Id. at 464. 
21 In a footnote, the Court suggested that mere unwillingness of potential donors to give 
because their names would be disclosed was not sufficient.  Buckley,  424 U.S. at 72 
n.88.  
22 Socialist Workers , 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
23 Id. at 100. 
24 Id. at 99. 
25 Socialist Workers  is also significant in that it concluded that Buckley's limits on 
disclosure requirements should apply to both contributions to as well as expenditures 
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Furthermore, in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, decided a decade 
after Buckley26 the Court recognized disclosure’s potential for imposing another 
burden on speech: the administrative cost and burdensome accounting 
responsibilities imposed by detailed disclosure and reporting laws.  This 
“administrative burden” concern was a direct consideration in MCFL.  In that 
case, a pro-life, non-profit corporation challenged the FECA’s absolute ban on 
corporate political spending.27  The FEC responded that MCFL could form a 
political committee or “PAC” under the FECA to avoid violating the ban on 
direct corporate spending.  MCFL replied by protesting that the strict 
accounting, disclosure, and reporting requirements imposed on PACs were 
prohibitive for a small organization. 
 
The Court agreed with MCFL:  “the administrative costs of complying 
with such increased responsibilities may create a disincentive for the 
organization itself to speak.”28  Further: 
 
Detailed record-keeping and disclosure 
obligations . . . impose administrative 
costs that many small entities may be 
unable to bear. . . .  Faced with the need 
to assume a more sophisticated 
organization form, to adopt specific 
accounting procedures, to file periodic 
detailed reports . . . it would not be 
surprising if at least some groups 
decided that the contemplated political 
activity was simply not worth it.29 
                                                                                                                         
made by a group, because laws requiring the identification of recipients of campaign 
disbursements can be just as harmful to First Amendment rights as those that require 
only the disclosure of campaign contributors.  Id. at 96.  See also Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999). 
26 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
27 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
28 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 255 n.7. 
29 Id. at 254-55. 
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The Court emphasized how burdensome the requirements are when applied to 
“small entities” and “small groups” whose activities consist predominantly of 
grassroots activities such as “garage sales, bake sales, and raffles.”30   
 
Significantly, the Supreme Court identified other grounds for 
invalidating disclosure: overbreadth and vagueness.  For example, in Buckley 
the Court considered whether the original FECA’s dollar thresholds were 
unconstitutionally low.  The 1974 Act had two thresholds:  political committees 
were required to keep records of names and addresses of persons making 
contributions in excess of $10.  For persons making aggregate contributions of 
more than $100, the committees  also were required to disclose their 
occupation and place of business.31  While Buckley upheld these provisions, it 
noted that the “thresholds are indeed low” – presaging subsequent cases that 
would find disclosure provisions insufficiently narrowly tailored, and therefore 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Buckley articulated another grounds for invalidating disclosure 
provisions. The Court applied to the FECA the generally applied principle that 
laws must provide persons with sufficient notice that their actions would be in 
violation of law in order for that law to be constitutional under the 5th 
Amendment’s due process clause.32 
Applying this “unconstitutional vagueness” doctrine to the FECA, the 
Court, in a holding with significant long-term effects on campaign finance law, 
found the FECA failed the test.33  The statute as originally drafted and enacted 
required disclosure of any independent expenditure spent “for the purpose of . 
. . influencing” an election or nomination.34  The Court ruled that the statutory 
language was unconstitutionally vague, and may subject many groups to 
disclosure requirements even if they were not engaged in partisan campaign 
                                                 
30 Id. at 255.  Compare Republican National Committee v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  There, the RNC challenged the FEC’s disclosure regulations regarding the duty 
of political committees to make “best efforts” to collect disclosure information from 
contributors.  The D.C. Circuit rejected the RNC’s assertion that this requirement 
imposed such large administrative burdens and costs that it constituted an 
unconstitutionally severe restriction on First Amendment rights, noting in particular the 
proportionally small financial burden imposed by the regulation. 
31 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82.  The current disclosure threshold under FECA for individual 
contributions is $200.  2 U.S.C. 434(b)(3)(A). 
32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79; see also id. at 41. 
33 Id. at 79. 
34 Id. 
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activities.  As the court said, the definition “could be interpreted to reach 
groups engaged purely in issue discussion.”35 
 
The Court, rather than striking the provision altogether, gave the 
statute a narrowing construction, interpreting the disclosure provisions to apply 
only to “express advocacy” campaign communications.36  Drawing on similar 
analysis from an earlier portion of the decision, it narrowed the reach of the 
independent expenditure disclosure provision to “communications that 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."37  
Under the Court’s construction, the requirements apply only to communications 
containing language such as   “vote for,  elect, support, cast your ballot for, 
vote against, defeat, or reject."38  Yet, the Court did not address the question 
whether disclosure requirements that do not suffer from the vagueness 
problems present in the original FECA could be applied to "issue advocacy" 
communications, that is, communications that do not use words which expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, but make explicit reference to a 
candidate. 
In summary, Buckley’s framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a 
disclosure regime consists of four steps.  First, under the exacting scrutiny test, 
the provision must advance substantial state interests.  Second, the means 
chosen must have a close relation to that state interest.  Third, the nature and 
extent of the burden or restriction on speech must be analyzed, usually in a 
very fact-specific way.  Fourth, the statute must be analyzed for overbreadth 
and vagueness.  Moreover, Buckley, read alone, suggests that, absent 
compelling facts that disclosure poses a severe restriction on a litigant, the 
scale tips toward disclosure.  Later cases, however, have brought this “pro-
disclosure” leaning into question. 
 
                          II.  ISSUE ADVOCACY DISCLOSURE AND RELATED ISSUES 
 
Candidate-specific issue advocacy -- that is, communications 
concerning candidates running for elective office, yet which fall short of the 
express advocacy test -- has emerged as one of the most contentious areas of 
election law in recent years.39  Yet, since Buckley the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 80. 
37 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1995). 
38 Id. at 44 n.52. 
39 See generally, Hearings on The First Amendment and Restrictions on Issue 
Advocacy, before Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (September 19, 1997). 
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never addressed this issue.40  Lower courts have thus had to confront to what 
extent Buckley’s express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction should apply to 
disclosure – with mixed results.  The Court has addressed issue advocacy 
disclosure in the context of ballot initiative campaigns – also with mixed results. 
  The Supreme Court has essentially applied the Buckley framework in these 
cases, without consistent results for disclosure statutes.  Finally, political 
broadcast disclosure requirements have been upheld by the lower courts, even 
in the non-candidate campaign context.  This section will examine each of 
these areas in turn. 
 
Candidate-Specific Issue Advocacy 
 
That the Court has not decided the constitutionality of issue advocacy 
disclosure is to some extent the result of the parties’ litigation strategy in 
Buckley.  A notably broad statutory disclosure provision was squarely 
addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, but that court’s 
decision to strike the provision was not appealed by the government. The 
provision at issue imposed reporting requirements on any group or individual 
who engaged in: 
 
Any act directed to the public for the 
purpose of influencing the outcome of 
an election, or . . . publishes or 
broadcasts to the public any material 
referring to a candidate . . . setting 
forth the candidate's position on any 
public issue, voting record, or other 
official acts . . . or otherwise designed 
to influence individuals to cast their 
votes for or against such candidates or 
to withhold their votes for such 
candidate.41 
                                                 
40 In MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, the Court found the communications in question constituted 
“express advocacy.”  In a number of other cases involving issue advocacy, the Court 
has declined certiorari review of lower court decisions raising the issue.  In Colorado 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), a case which 
centered on the question of whether the Colorado Republican Party’s political 
advertising at issue was “express advocacy,” the Court vacated the 10th Circuit’s 
decision (which found express advocacy) but never addressed the issue itself in the 
case. 
41 2 U.S.C § 437a (1974) (repealed 1976) (emphasis added). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals in Buckley found this language 
unconstitutional, because it was vague and violated the constitutional rights of 
groups engaged in protected speech.  The court stated: 
 
As we have said, it [section 437a] may 
undertake to compel disclosure by 
groups that do no more than discuss 
issues of public interest on a wholly 
non-partisan basis. To be sure, any 
discussion of important public 
questions can possibly exert some 
influence on the outcome of an election 
preceding which they were campaign 
issues [sic.] . . . But unlike contributions 
and expenditures made solely with a 
view to influencing the nomination or 
election of a candidate, issue 
discussions unwedded to the cause of 
a particular candidate hardly threaten 
the purity of the election.  Moreover, 
and very importantly, such discussions 
are vital and indispensable to a free 
society and an informed electorate.  
Thus the interest group engaging in 
nonpartisan discussions ascends to a 
high plane, while the governmental 
interest in disclosure correspondingly 
diminishes.42 
This aspect of the court's decision was not appealed by the statute's 
challengers (it was the only point upon which the challengers prevailed at the 
Court of Appeals).  Nor did the government appeal, apparently believing that 
the vague language of the provision coupled with the virtually unlimited reach 
of the disclosure requirement to contributions of $10 or more to hundreds of 
non-political organizations was indefensible.  Accordingly, in Buckley the 
Supreme Court was not presented directly with the question whether all 
campaign speech must contain "express advocacy" to be subject to registration 
and reporting requirements in disclosure laws, nor when (if ever) issue 
                                                 
42 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).  The D.C. 
Circuit cited with approval the Second Circuit’s 1972 decision in U.S. v. Nat’l Comm. 
for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2nd Cir. 1972), in which the Second Circuit held that 
the 1971 FECA disclosure provision did not cover an advertisement in the New York 
Times by an ad hoc group of citizens urging President Nixon’s impeachment. 
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discussion might be sufficiently “wedded to the cause of a particular candidate” 
to warrant disclosure. 
 
Moreover, in North Carolina Right to Life Inc. v. Bartlett,43 a non-profit 
corporation challenged the state's registration and reporting requirements of 
political committees, broadly defined to include "any person, committee . . . the 
primary or incidental purpose of which is to support or oppose any candidate or 
political party or to influence or attempt to influence the result of an election . . . 
."44  The court stated that this provision meant that “[g]roups engaging only in 
issue advocacy are thus subject to spending restrictions and reporting 
requirements.  This violates the First Amendment as construed by the Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo.  The court accordingly found the statute fatally 
overbroad and unconstitutional.45 
 
At issue in West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith,46 was the state of 
West Virginia’s  attempts to regulate voter guides by amending into its state law 
a presumption that any scorecards, voter guides or other analysis of a 
candidate's positions or votes, published or distributed within 60 days of an 
election is presumed to be "for the purpose of advocating or opposing the 
nomination, election or defeat of a candidate.”47 A right-to-life group challenged 
this law as a violation of the First Amendment, because it regulated political 
speech beyond that containing express advocacy. 
 
In the district court's opinion granting the group's motion seeking a 
preliminary injunction, the court stated that its case was likely to succeed on 
the merits since the Supreme Court has articulated a bright line standard that 
separated express advocacy which could be subject to regulation, from issue 
advocacy, which could not be regulated.48  The court specifically criticized the 
                                                 
43 North Carolina Right to Life Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 675 (E.D. N.C. 1998) aff’d in pt., 
rev’d in pt., 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999). 
44 Id. at 679. 
45 Id. 
46 West Virginians for Life, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W.Va. 1996) (granting 
preliminary injunction); see also West Virginians for Life, Inc v. Smith, 952 F. Supp. 
342 (1996) (awarding fees and costs); West Virginians for Life, Inc v. Smith, 960 F. 
Supp. 1036 (1996) (deciding on summary judgment motion). 
47 W. Va. Code. § 3-8-5(e)(1)(1995). 
48 West Virginians for Life, Inc, 919 F. Supp. at 959.  But see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 
(refusing to hold issue advocacy can never be subject to disclosure provisions, but 
rather than statute in question was unconstitutionally vague as drafted). 
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presumption that scorecards or voter guides distributed within 60 days of an 
election could be regulated as express advocacy.49 Furthermore, in its decision 
awarding attorneys fees and costs, the court justified charging these fees 
against the state since the statute "attempted to circumvent legal precedent 
through the transparent device of a presumption that expenditures made within 
sixty days of an election are express advocacy."50 
 
Lower courts have also extended the legal principle beyond “magic 
words” express advocacy.  For instance, the Second Circuit in FEC v. Survival 
Education Fund51 assessed the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 44ld(a).  The provision 
imposes a disclaimer requirement on any person who makes communications 
expressly advocating election or defeat or solicits any contribution (i.e. money 
or thing of value for the purpose of influencing a federal election).  Such 
communications or solicitations must include a notice in the communication 
stating who paid for the mailing and whether or not it is authorized by a 
candidate.  The case concerned a July, 1984 direct mail fundraising appeal by 
author and political activist Benjamin Spock on behalf of a pro-nuclear freeze 
group, which read: 
 
Your special election-year contribution 
today will help us communicate your 
views to hundreds of thousands of 
members of the voting public, letting 
them know why Ronald Reagan and his 
anti-people policies must be stopped.52 
The FEC charged that the solicitation was subject to FECA’s 
contribution solicitation disclosure requirement, even though it did not contain 
express advocacy.  The second circuit agreed.  The Second Circuit closely 
reviewed Buckley and the legislative history of the FECA, noting that Congress 
had enacted the solicitation disclosure requirement, which previously had only 
applied to solicitations containing express advocacy, specifically to cover to 
solicitations whether or not they included express advocacy: 
 
Even if a communication does not itself 
constitute express advocacy, it may still 
fall within the reach of sec. 441d(a) if it 
contains solicitations clearly indicating 
                                                 
49West Virginians for Life, Inc, 960 F. Supp. at 1039-40. 
50 West Virginians for Life, Inc, 952 F. Supp. at 348. 
51 FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, 5 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). 
52 Id. at 289. 
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that the contributions will be targeted to 
the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office . . 
. . That statement leaves no doubt that 
the funds contributed would be used to 
advocate President Reagan’s defeat at 
the polls, not simply to criticize his 
policies during the election year.53 
Survival Education Fund held that the disclosure provision was 
constitutional, because Buckley’s express advocacy test was confined to the 
definition of independent expenditure, and because the disclosure requirement 
at issue in the case applied only to solicitations that target the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.54  Moreover, it recognized the 
governmental interest in ensuring that contributors know whether their money 
is going directly to a candidate or to independent critics of another candidate 
so they "are not misled into giving money to candidates or causes they do not 
support.”55 
 
Notably, too, in 1997 a lower court in Wisconsin in Elections Bd. v. 
Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce went further, explicitly holding that the express 
advocacy test was not the only possible acceptable constitutional test for 
permissible disclosure.  The state's requirement that groups making 
contributions and expenditures register as political committees was the basis of 
an enforcement action against several organizations that sponsored issue 
advertisements.  The advertisements, broadcast in October 1996, discussed a 
state legislator's vote on specific issues and urged the viewer to call the 
legislator to protest or express support for the position.  For instance, one 
advertisement asked the viewer to "Call [your state legislator] . . . Tell him not 
to hike taxes again." The legislators under criticism filed complaints with the 
Wisconsin Elections Board, and Board staff determined that the advertisements 
were subject to registration and reporting requirements since they were 
broadcast for "political purposes." The legislators also filed actions for 
                                                 
53 Id. at 295. 
54 Id. at 293. 
55 Id. at 297.  While allowing the FEC to insist that a disclaimer be present in the SEF 
solicitation materials, the Second Circuit refused to prohibit SEF, a non-profit 
corporation, from engaging in such speech.  It held that SEF was the sort of non-profit 
corporation described by the Supreme Court in MCFL, constitutionally permitted to 
engage in political speech.  Id. at 292-93. 
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injunctive relief in state court, which were granted during the final days of the 
1996 campaign.56 
 
In March of 1997, the Election Board in turn found that the 
advertisements were express advocacy and thus the sponsors were subject to 
Wisconsin disclosure laws.  When the sponsors still refused to comply on First 
Amendments grounds, the Election Board filed suit.  The trial court concluded 
that the state could adopt – although it had not done so -- a definition of 
express advocacy that differed from the one articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Buckley and its progeny, "so long as the definition itself meets constitutional 
requirements under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”  Concluding that 
the state had failed to provide a clear, advance definition of express advocacy, 
the court dismissed the state’s complaint.57  
 
On direct appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling. 58  The court based its rulings on the elections board’s 
retroactive application of a disclosure regulation that was not formulated until 
after the political advertisements had already been broadcast.59  Consequently, 
the court held that the business groups had not received adequate advanced 
warning as required by due process provisions of the United States 
Constitution.60  The court declined to make a definite constitutional ruling on 
the larger on the larger underlying issue in the case – what constitutes express 
advocacy.61  In dicta, the court stated that under Buckley an express advocacy 
standard would require “explicit” words of advocacy,62 but commented that 
under MCFL such words were not confined to Buckley’s “magic words.”  The 
court also noted that contextual factors of a political communication could be 
considered in determining whether a communication constitutes express 
advocacy.63  The court concluded by inviting the Wisconsin legislature or 
elections board to draft a new standard of express advocacy.64  On October 5, 
                                                 
56 Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, No. 97-CV-1729 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Dane 
Cty., Jan. 16, 1998), aff’d, 597 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. 1999). . 
57 Id.  
58 Election Bd. of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. 
1999).   
59Id. at 734-36. 
60Id.  
61Id. at 736. 
62Id. at 730-31. 
63Id.  
64Id. at 736.  On September 29, the elections board adopted an administrative rule 
defining express advocacy as statements containing such terms as “elect” or “defeat” 
or their “functional equivalents with reference to a clearly identified candidate that 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of the candidate and that unambiguously 
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1999, Wisconsin’s attorney general petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to review the ruling in spite of the elections board’s decision, more than 
two months earlier, not to seek such review.  
 
Ballot Initiatives and Referenda 
 
In contrast to candidate-specific issue advocacy disclosure, where the 
Supreme Court has remained silent, the Court has reviewed another category 
of issue advocacy disclosure-- ballot initiative or referenda disclosure.  In that 
area, the Court has moved from the Buckley analysis in two regards that have 
made ballot initiative disclosure more likely to be found unconstitutional; first, it 
grants a broader interest in completely anonymous communication; and 
second, it discounts the issue of quid pro quo corruption in a ballot initiative 
contest. 
 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,65 although not directing 
concerning disclosure, addressed it in dicta.  Bellotti asserted that the 
informational interest first articulated in Buckley may justify disclosure in the 
ballot initiative realm.  Citing Buckley and U.S. v. Harriss, the Court suggested 
that sponsor identification for referenda campaign communications would be 
constitutional.  “Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a 
means of disclosure so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments 
to which they are being subjected."66 The Court indicated a source disclosure 
requirement would be justified to further the First Amendment’s notion that “the 
people are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the 
relative merits of conflicting arguments.  They may consider in making their 
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate."67 
 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley68 more directly addressed 
ballot initiative disclosure. In that decision, the Court considered a Berkeley 
ordinance which limited contributions to committees formed to support or 
oppose ballot measures.  The ordinance also required disclosure by ballot 
campaign committees of their contributors.  The Court determined that the 
contribution limits were unconstitutional under the Bellotti analysis, since the 
danger of corruption that justified contribution limits to candidates could not be 
                                                                                                                         
relates to the campaign of that candidate.” 
65 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
66 Id. at 792 n.3. 
67 Id. at 791-92. 
68 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
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extended to ballot measure races.69  While there was no constitutional 
challenge to the disclosure requirements, the Court wrote favorably of them, 
indicating that they facilitate public awareness of the sources of support for 
committees.70 
 
Furthermore, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,71 the Court 
addressed a requirement that all ballot initiative literature include disclaimers 
disclosing the source of the literature.  The Ohio Elections Commission fined 
Margaret McIntyre $100 for distributing unsigned leaflets which omitted a 
identification disclaimer.  Mrs. McIntyre distributed the leaflets, which protested 
a proposed school tax levy, with the help of her son and a friend. Some of the 
handbills named her as the author; others were signed merely "CONCERNED 
PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS."72 
 
The Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional as applied by Ohio 
to Mrs. McIntyre.  Extolling the virtues and historical role of anonymous 
individual speech, the Court noted that the Ohio statute was a direct regulation 
of pure speech subject to "exacting scrutiny."73 
 
Ohio asserted the interests analogous to Buckley:  preventing fraud 
and libelous statements and providing the electorate with relevant information.  
                                                 
69 Id. at 298. 
70 Id.  The Court also noted that political groups may often serve as front groups or 
subterfuges.  “It is true that when individuals or corporations speak through 
committees, they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true 
identity of the source.”  Id. at 298; see also FCC sponsor identification rules, 47 
C.F.R. 73.1212(e). 
71 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
72 Id. at 337. 
73 Id. at 346. Despite McIntyre’s assertion the Court was applying exacting scrutiny, its 
articulation of that standard actually describes strict scrutiny: the statute would be 
constitutional only if narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.  Id. at 347. 
The difference may be explained by the inclusion of the disclaimer in the handbill itself, 
and the court’s consequent judgment that it is a “content-based” regulation.  But 
compare RNC v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating the critical test is 
whether a regulation is content-neutral, i.e. viewpoint neutral, not whether disclosure 
requires inclusion of content per se) (emphasis added).  The Court also seemed to 
harbor concerns that the requirement would expose Mrs. McIntyre to the type of 
hostility, threats, harassment, and reprisals at issue in Socialist Workers . 
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The Court did not find the informational interest persuasive on the facts of the 
case: 
 
The simple interest in providing voters 
with additional relevant information 
does not justify [the disclosure 
requirement].  Moreover, in the case of 
a handbill written by a private citizen 
who is not known to the recipient, 
[disclosure of the author’s name] adds 
little, if anything, to the reader’s ability 
to evaluate the document’s message.  
Thus Ohio’s informational interest is 
plainly insufficient to support the 
constitutionality of its disclosure 
requirement.74 
Next, the Court addressed the anti-fraud interest.  Although the Court 
recognized that election-time fraud can have serious adverse consequences 
for the public at large, it noted that, insofar as it was targeted to combat fraud, 
the provision in question was duplicative of several more specific prohibitions 
against making or disseminating false statements during political campaigns in 
Ohio's Election Code.75  Therefore the Court found the statute fatally 
overbroad and not narrowly tailored.  The statute applied not only to 
candidates and their organized supporters but also to individuals acting 
independently; not only to candidate elections, or to communications made 
immediately preceding the election, but also ballot issues that present a much 
smaller risk of libel or the appearance of corruption and to those made weeks 
in advance.  The Court felt that because of the statute's failure to make these 
distinctions and its breadth, it was not narrowly tailored to alleviate the dangers 
of fraud or impropriety.76  Indeed, the key consideration in the case seems to 
be the overbreadth issue.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens said, 
“[a] more limited identification requirement” might have been justified.77 
 
                                                 
74 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-9. 
75 Id. at 349. 
76 Id. at 352. 
77 Id. at 352.  McIntyre did not explicitly address whether its analysis extended to 
contributions.  In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 
(1981)  indicated in dicta that legislatures are capable of enacting a ban on 
anonymous contributions.  
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A recently decided case, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation,78 also addressed disclosure in the ballot initiative petition context.  
The Court reviewed two disclosure provisions of the Colorado statute 
governing the ballot initiative petition process:  (1) A provision requiring 
disclosure of names and addresses of all persons who served as paid initiative 
ballot qualification petition circulators, and the total dollar amount paid to each 
circulator; and (2) a provision requiring all circulators to wear name badges 
while soliciting signatures for the initiative petitions.79 
 
First, the Court unanimously struck the name badge requirement.  
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, reasoned that the provision constituted 
compelled disclosure likely to chill political speech – in this case, the circulation 
of the petition – without sufficient compelling state interest to justify such a 
restriction.  In her analysis of the name badge provision, Justice Ginsburg 
focused largely on the chilling effect the badges would have in discouraging 
persons from serving as circulators.  Justice Ginsburg noted testimony from the 
district court trial that the name badge requirement exposed circulators to 
harassment, recrimination and retaliation, “inhibiting participation in the 
petitioning process.”80   
 
Colorado attempted to justify the provision by asserting the state’s 
interest in deterring fraud.  The Court, however, did not find the interest to be 
convincing.  Specifically, the Court noted Colorado already required circulators 
to submit an affidavit listing their name and address, thereby enabling law 
enforcers to investigate fraud without exposing the circulators to harassment. 
Given these alternative means of effecting the same state interest, the Court 
dismissed the need for the name badge provision, and struck it down.81 
 
Second, Justice Ginsburg then declared unconstitutional certain of the 
statute’s reporting provisions in a section of the Court’s opinion joined by only 
                                                 
78 Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) [hereinafter ACLF]. 
79 The Court also reviewed a non-disclosure provision of the statute requiring that all 
petition circulators be registered Colorado voters.  The six justice majority struck down 
the registration requirement on free speech grounds, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor and Breyer dissenting.  Id. at  644-45. In addition, a portion of the 
Colorado statute unchallenged by the petitioners in ACLF requires persons or groups 
filing initiative petitioners to register with the state, and report the amount they spend 
to qualify the initiative for the ballot. 
80 Id. at 645. 
81 Id. at 646.  
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four other justices.82  Under the Colorado law, petition sponsors were required 
to file monthly pre-election reports and a final post-election report disclosing all 
paid circulators’ names and addresses, and the amount of compensation they 
received for circulating the petition.  No such provision applied to volunteer 
circulators. 
 
The majority upheld the 10th Circuit’s holding that the reporting 
requirement was unconstitutional, concurring in the lower court’s reasoning that 
the anti-fraud and informational interests recognized by Buckley were already 
promoted by disclosure of sponsors who made expenditures.83  Justice 
Ginsburg wrote, “[t]he added benefit of revealing the names of paid circulators 
and amounts paid to each circulator, the lower courts fairly determined from the 
record as a whole is hardly apparent and has not been demonstrated.”84 
 
Justice Ginsburg concludes her analysis of the reporting requirements 
by briefly raising other considerations.  First, drawing on Bellotti, she states 
that ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of “quid pro quo” corruption like 
candidate elections, thus undermining the anti-corruption argument.  Second, 
she said that the risk of fraud or corruption is remote at the petition stage of an 
initiative.85  Finally, she disputes and disapproves the assertion – implicit in the 
statute and explicitly defended by Colorado -- that paid petition circulators are 
more likely to engage in petition fraud than volunteers.  Consequently, she 
                                                 
82 Justices Souter, Kennedy, Stevens, and Scalia.  Justice Thomas concurred in the 
holding but not the reasoning of the disclosure decision. 
83 Id. at 647-49.  The Colorado statute does not appear to require disclosure of 
contributors to the ballot initiative sponsor.  Nonetheless, the majority’s opinion in this 
regard injects into the court’s disclosure jurisprudence a novel distinction between 
disclosure of sponsors and contributors, on one hand, and of expenditure or payment 
recipients on the other.  In Buckley, disclosure of contributions and expenditures were 
given both upheld under exacting scrutiny, and both were adjudged to be justified by 
important state interests.  This is in contrast to the limitations on contributions and in 
expenditures in Buckley.  The Buckley court upheld the former, and struck the latter.  
In ACFL, the Court applies the contribution/expenditure distinction to disclosure for the 
first time. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent implicitly makes powerful arguments 
against the novel contribution/expenditure disclosure distinction used by the majority 
in its reporting analysis, noting that expenditure recipients (also called vendors or 
“payees”) are often the key actors in the ballot initiative process.  
84 Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636, 648 (1999). 
85 See opinion of Justice O’Connor. Insofar as combating petition qualification fraud is 
an important state interest, its importance occurs during the petition circulation period 
– when the fraud can be redressed -- not later in the election process. 
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deems the circulator disclosure portions of the reporting requirements 
unconstitutional.86 
 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate opinion, 
concurring with the majority’s holding concerning name badges, but dissenting 
regarding the disclosure provisions. In a strongly worded opinion, Justice 
O’Connor termed the majority’s opinion a “disturbing” invalidation of “vitally 
important” disclosure regulations.87 
 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis varied from the majority opinion in several 
ways.  First, unlike the majority, she asserted the reporting requirement 
needed only be justified by a low level scrutiny standard of a legitimate state 
purpose, not an important or compelling one required by exacting or strict 
scrutiny.  Her analysis of the state interests at issue also differed from the 
majority.  Justice O’Connor said the anti-fraud and informational interests 
provide a sufficient basis to uphold the reporting requirement.  Regarding the 
fraud argument, she noted the trial testimony of substantial petition fraud in 
Colorado by paid petition circulators.  O’Connor also forcefully argues for the 
informational interest: 
 
Colorado’s disclosure reports provide 
facts useful to voters who are weighing 
the options.  Member of the public 
deciding whether to sign a petition or 
how to vote on a measure can discover 
who has proposed it, who has provided 
funds for its circulation, and to whom 
these funds have been provided.  
Knowing the names of paid circulators 
and the amount paid to them also 
allows members of the public to 
evaluate the sincerity or, alternatively, 
the potential bias of any circulator that 
approaches them.88 
Concluding, O’Connor says she would uphold the reporting requirement under 
either exacting scrutiny or a lower standard.  
 
                                                 
86 Id. at 649. 
87 Id. at 656 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 658 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Disclosure of Political Broadcast Advertising (Television and Radio) – 
Differing Judicial Perspectives 
 
An issue unaddressed by the Supreme Court, and on which courts have 
taken a variety of approaches, is whether disclosure requirements may be 
applied to political broadcast (television and radio) issue advertising .  
Significantly, McIntyre explicitly left this an open question, as Justice Stevens' 
decision for the court said that that case does not apply to broadcast 
advertising.89 
 
In Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell,90 the federal district court for Vermont  
addressed a campaign finance reform measure which provided disclosure 
requirements for "political advertisements and reporting  requirements for 
"mass media activities”.  Political advertisements were defined in the law as 
"any communication which expressly or implicitly advocates the success or 
defeat of a candidate."91 "Mass media activities" included communications that 
included the name or likeness of a candidate for office.  Political 
advertisements were required to carry the name and address of the person 
sponsoring it, and designate the candidate, party, or committee on whose 
behalf it was published.  Persons spending $500 or more within 30 days of an 
election on mass media activities would be required to report the expenditures 
to the state and to the candidate whose likeness appeared in the spot, within 
24 hours of making the expenditure.92  The federal district court held that 
political advertisements and the expenditures for mass media activities must be 
narrowly construed to apply only to messages containing express advocacy to 
save the statutes from unconstitutionality.93 
 
In contrast to Vermont Right to Life, in KVUE v. Moore,94 a Texas 
television station challenged Texas statute broadcast sponsorship regulations, 
similar to federal regulations discussed below, requiring advertisers to include 
in advertisements a disclaimer “paid political announcement” and the name and 
address of the agent who purchased the advertising time.  The requirement 
                                                 
89 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 338 n.3 (1995). 
90 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrel, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Vt. 1998). 
91 Id. at 208 (quoting VT. STAT . ANN. TIT. 17 sec. 2881) (Supp. 1997). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 213. 
94 KVUE v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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applied to “any political advertising,” – encompassing candidate advertising 
and issue advertising.”95  
 
The station challenged the statute as an infringement on broadcaster’s 
First Amendment rights, asserting that it “stripped the broadcaster of absolute 
editorial control” and penalizing speech based on its political content.96  The 5th 
Circuit summarily dismissed the contention, drawing on Anderson v. 
Calabreze97 and Storer v. Brown.98  The Court stated that that the requirements 
were generally applicable and even –handed that protect the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process itself, terming this state interest 
“compelling.”99  The court said the regulations were content-neutral, and that 
the burden was of “an extremely limited nature.”100 
 
Federal regulations, similar to the Texas state regulations, have 
governed political issue advocacy advertisements broadcast by TV and radio 
stations since passage of the very earliest versions of the Radio and 
Communications Acts in the 1920s and 30s.101  FCC regulations promulgated 
under the Communications Act, provide: 
 
(a) When a broadcast station transmits 
any matter for which money . . . is . . . 
paid . . . the station at the time of the 
broadcast shall announce (1) that such 
matter is sponsored, paid for, or 
furnished, either in whole or in part, 
and (2) by whom or on whose behalf 
such consideration was supplied. 
 
(b) The licensee of each broadcast 
station shall exercise reasonable 
                                                 
95 Id. at 926. 
96 Id. at 937. 
97 Anderson v. Calabreze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
98 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
99 KVUE v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 937 (5th Cir. 1983). 
100 Id. 
101 For an excellent discussion about the legislative history and early administration of 
the political identification statute and regulations, see Loveday v.FCC, 707 F.2d 1143, 
1449 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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diligence to obtain from its employees 
and from other persons with whom it 
deals directly information to enable 
such licensee to make the 
announcement 
 
(e) The announcement required by this 
section shall . . . fully and fairly disclose 
the true identity of the person or 
persons, or corporation or other entity 
by whom or on whose behalf such 
payment is made.  Where the material 
broadcast is political matter or matter 
involving the discussion of a 
controversial issue of public importance 
and a corporation . . . unincorporated 
group, or other entity is paying for or 
furnishing the broadcast matter, the 
station shall . . . [also] require that a list 
of the chief executive officers or 
members of the executive committee or 
of the board of directors¼ shall be 
made available for public inspection.102 
 
The statute and regulation’s scope has been substantially unexplored 
by the courts, and its constitutionality has not been ruled on.103  However, the 
scope of the phrase "reasonable diligence" was considered in Loveday v. 
FCC.104  In this case, a group supporting a ballot measure restricting smoking 
filed a complaint with the FCC asserting that an advertisement against the 
initiative was sponsored by the Tobacco Industry, rather than the identified 
sponsor, Californians Against Regulatory Excess.  The group claimed that the 
law required "the exertion of every effort" by licensees to determine the true 
sponsors of paid material."105  Instead, the Commission applied, and the court 
                                                 
102 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1998) (emphasis added). 
103 See Hearings on: The First Amendment and Restrictions on Issue Advocacy, 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (September 19, 1997)(testimony of James Bopp, conceding 
broadcast disclosure regulations have never been subject to court challenge).  But see 
KVUE v. Moore, 709 F.2d at 937 (1983) (upholding requirements against constitutional 
challenge). 
104 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). 
105 Id. at 1448.  
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approved, a standard that permitted broadcasters to accept the apparent 
sponsor's representations that it is the sponsor, when, as here, faced with 
undocumented allegations."106 Requiring broadcasters to investigate would 
"judicialize the process of being allowed to utter a political statement."107 The 
court suggested that such heightened requirements could implicate the First 
Amendment, and would have the practical effect of discouraging broadcasters 
to air these advertisements."108 
 
While the effect of Loveday was to suggest that the identification 
regulations may have become toothless, recent FCC decisions havetaken a 
different approach and announced a greater obligation for broadcasters.  The 
Commission has evidenced a determination to demonstrate that the regulations 
are enforceable and stations do have real responsibilities under them.  In 
1996, the FCC found that numerous stations broadcasting issue 
advertisements had violated the sponsorship identification rules by failing to 
disclose the true sponsor of advertisements opposing an anti-smoking ballot 
measure."  The advertisements in question identified "Fairness Matters to 
Oregonians Committee" as the sponsor, even though the Tobacco Institute, a 
trade association of large tobacco companies, had funded, designed, and 
implemented the advertisements.109  In reviewing whether broadcast licensees 
could be charged with identifying and disclosing such hidden sponsors, the 
FCC noted preliminarily that broadcast licensees cannot generally be expected 
to investigate independently whether the persons with whom they deal directly 
are the true sponsors.  The Commission held that where a challenge is made 
to the legitimacy of sponsorship information and where there is strong evidence 
that both advertisement funding and editorial direction are controlled by 
someone other than the listed sponsor, however, broadcast licensees are 
required to exercise "reasonable diligence" in determining who the actual 
sponsor of the advertisements is and requiring that the proper information be 
displayed on the advertisement.  Here, the Commission determined that the 
stations had not identified the true sponsor, the Tobacco Institute, but issued 
no sanctions against them, because they had not had the information 
necessary to disclose the true sponsor, and "may have been uncertain how to 
proceed in the absence of definitive guidance from the Commission."110 
 
                                                 
106 Id. at 1449.  
107 Id. at 1458. 
108 Id. at 1457. 
109 11 F.C.C.R. 20415, 1996 WL 635821 (Oct. 29, 1996). 
110 Id. 
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III.  LOBBYIST DISCLOSURE, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, LEGISLATIVE 
INVESTIGATIONS AND TRIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
In addition to campaign disclosure and issue advocacy and advertising 
disclosure, lobbyist disclosure, governmental financial disclosure, and 
disclosure in the course of court proceedings or legislative investigations all 
implicate First Amendment interests.  These areas are considered in turn. 
 
Constitutionality of Requiring Disclosure of Lobbying Activities 
In United States v. Harriss,111 the Supreme Court examined the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act, which required every person "receiving any 
contributions or expending any money for the purpose of influencing the 
passage or defeat of any legislation by Congress" to report contributions 
(including the name and address of contributors) and expenditures.112  To 
avoid the constitutional problem of vagueness, the Court construed the Act as 
applying only to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or 
proposed federal legislation, including communications directly by lobbyists 
themselves, their employees, and through letter writing campaigns.113 
 
The Court held that as construed, the Act did not violate the "freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment - freedom to speak, publish, and petition 
the government."114  Although the Court did not state explicitly what level of 
scrutiny it applied in arriving at this analysis, it did balance possible 
infringements on First Amendment rights against the government's interests in 
maintaining the integrity of the governmental process.  The statute served 
Congress's interest in self protection by enabling it to evaluate pressures put 
upon it, such as who is being hired to lobby, who is paying for lobbying 
activities, and how much money is being spent.115 Thus, the "voice of the 
people" would not be "drowned out by the voice of special interest groups 
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public 
weal."116 
 
                                                 
111 U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
112 2 U.S.C. §§ 261 et. seq. 
113 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620-21. 
114 Id. at 625. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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The Court held that, under these circumstances, Congress had used its 
power of self-protection in a "manner restricted to its appropriate end" without 
offending the First Amendment.117 The Court reasoned that any burden on 
First Amendment rights, such as a person remaining silent out of fear of 
possible prosecution for failing to comply with the Act, was too remote and 
hypothetical to justify striking down the statute.118 
 
Several court decisions since Harriss have both reaffirmed Harriss' 
holding, requiring disclosure of lobbying expenses is constitutional, and 
broadened its application."119  In Florida League of Professional Lobbyists v. 
Meggs, for example, the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to Florida's 
lobbying disclosure law, which required disclosure not only of direct lobbying 
expenditures but also indirect expenses without direct contact with 
governmental officials.120 Although not explicitly stating that strict scrutiny 
applied, the Florida League court appeared to apply that standard.  It 
determined that the state's interest in illuminating the pressures to be 
evaluated by voters and officials were "compelling."  The court further noted 
that the government's interest in providing a method for evaluating these 
pressures was even stronger when those pressures were indirect, since 
indirect pressures are harder for the public and the government to identify 
without the aid of disclosure.121 
 
Like the Harriss court, the Florida League court noted that the First 
Amendment burdens posed by the statute's detractors were too hypothetical to 
justify invalidating the law.  In justifying the above analysis with respect to 
indirect communications, the Florida League court relied on Harriss' 
construction of "direct communication" as including an "artificially stimulated 
letter writing campaign." This demonstrates that courts tend to interpret Harriss 
broadly to allow a wide range of disclosure requirements of lobbying activities. 
 
                                                 
117 Id. at 626. 
118 U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954). 
119 See Florida League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457 (11th Cir. 1996); 
Minnesota Sate Ethical Practices v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Associated Indus. of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1995); Fair 
Politica1 Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 
1979). 
120 Florida League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc., 87 F.3d. at 460. 
121 Id. at 461. 
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The Eighth Circuit in Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board v. Nat'l 
Rifle Association122 extended the analysis of Harriss to permit registration and 
reporting of lobbying where the only activity was correspondence from a 
national organization to its members in Minnesota, urging their support for 
specific state legislation.  State law required the individual at the national office 
making the contacts to register as a lobbyist and file regular reports.123  
Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that Minnesota's interest in 
disclosure outweighed any infringement of the group's First Amendment 
rights.124  The court observed that the appellants had argued that their 
situation deserved protection because the activity occurred between members 
of a voluntary association, but stated that: 
 
[W]e do not think this distinction is 
constitutionally significant.  The Act 
does not focus on the group affiliation 
of a lobbyist, it focuses on lobbying 
activity.  When persons engage in an 
extensive letter writing campaign for the 
purpose of influencing specific 
legislation, the State's interest is the 
same whether or not those persons are 
members of an association.  The 
appellants have articulated no reason 
why their membership in the NRA 
should give them any greater 
constitutional protection with respect to 
lobbying activity than is enjoyed by 
other citizens.125 
The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld that state's lobbyist registration, 
disclosure, and reporting requirements in Associated Industries of Kentucky v. 
Commonwealth.126  This court expressly stated that it was applying strict 
scrutiny to the law to protect the appellant's First Amendment right to petition 
and freedom of association.  The court found the state's law was supported by 
                                                 
122 Minnesota State Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n., 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 
1985). 
123 Id. at 511. 
124 Id. at 512. 
125 Id. at 513. 
126 Associated Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1995). 
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a compelling interest and was sufficiently narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgment of association rights.127  In particular, the Kentucky court found that 
the Supreme Court's decisions finding compelled disclosure unconstitutional 
were not universally applicable.  The court noted, however, that the law at 
issue did not compel "disclosure of membership in organizations engaged in 
advocacy," suggesting that a law requiring the disclosure of membership could 
be overbroad.128 
 
The Foreign Agents Registration Act and United States v. Peace 
Information Center. 
 
The Foreign Agents Registration Act and its disclosure requirements 
have also withstood constitutional scrutiny.  In United States v. Peace 
Information Center129 the court held that mandatory disclosure in this area 
was within the powers of Congress and identified two separate bases for its 
conclusion: the inherent authority of Congress to legislate on the subject of 
foreign relations, and the constitutional authority of Congress to legislate 
concerning national defense.130  The court did not specify a standard of 
review, but was deferential to the legislative judgment of constitutionality.131 
Specifically addressing First Amendment concerns, the court observed that 
the statute: 
 
neither limits nor interferes with 
freedom of speech.  It does not 
regulate expression of ideas.  Nor does 
it preclude the making of any 
utterances.  It merely requires persons 
carrying on certain activities to identify 
themselves.132 
                                                 
127 Id. at 952-53. 
128 Id. at 953 (distinguishing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little 
Rock, 362 U.S. 516 (1960)). 
129 97 F. Supp. 255. 
130 Id. at 259-63. 
131 Id. at 262-263. 
132 Id. at 262.  Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n. , 514 U.S. 334, 378 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)  (“[Disclosure] forbids . . .the express of no idea, but 
merely requires identification of the speaker. . .”). 
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The court therefore concluded that foreign agent disclosure is consistent with 
the First Amendment, not unlike laws requiring a person to register or procure 
a license before engaging in certain occupations.133 
 
Disclosure of Personal Finances by Governmental Officials 
 
Courts have upheld statutes requiring personal financial disclosure 
against challenges that such statutes violate the individual's right to privacy.  In 
Plante v. Gonzales,134 for example, the Fifth Circuit addressed the 
constitutionality of Florida's financial disclosure requirements for government 
officials and candidates for state or local office.  Several senators challenged 
the law as abridging their right to privacy under the 14th Amendment.  The 
court distinguished between this claim and claims that compelled disclosure of 
members in an organization unconstitutionally burdened constitutional rights. 
 
Here, memberships, associations, and 
beliefs are revealed, if at all, only 
tangentially.  The Amendment calls for 
disclosure of assets, debts, and 
sources of income, each to be 
identified and valued.  Although in 
some particular situations, rigorous 
application of the Amendment might 
implicate First Amendment freedoms, 
when considering the Amendment on 
its face this threat is too remote to raise 
the issue.135 
Absent a First Amendment element, the court applied a balancing test, rather 
than strict scrutiny. 
 
The district court found that four 
important state concerns are 
significantly advanced by the 
Amendment: the public's "Right to 
know" an official's interests, deterrence 
                                                 
133 Id. at 262 (distinguishing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) (holding that 
a "requirement that one must register [for a labor union organizer's card] before he 
undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite 
incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment")). 
134 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978). 
135 Id. at 1132-33. 
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of corruption and conflicting interests, 
creation of public confidence in 
Florida's officials, and assistance in 
detecting and prosecuting officials who 
have violated the law.  The importance 
of these goals cannot be denied.  The 
question is whether the Sunshine 
Amendment significantly promotes 
them.136 
Balanced against these interests were the Senator's interest in financial 
confidentiality.  The court noted that, as Senators, these litigants were 
legitimately subject to more scrutiny of their affairs than an ordinary private 
citizen, making an analogy to libel law decisions.137  The court concluded that 
the disclosure law did not violate the senators' privacy rights. 
 
In Igneri v. Moore,138 the court sustained provisions of the New York 
Ethics in Government Act that required annual financial disclosure by a number 
of government officials as applied to a political party chairman.  The court, 
assessing the disclosure requirement under the [intermediate scrutiny], or 
balancing, analysis applicable to privacy challenges, found a "substantial state 
interest in exposing and curbing the improper uses" of the influence possessed 
by party chairman.139  It stated that: 
 
Full disclosure ensures that the 
financial interests of party chairman -- 
the interests most susceptible to the 
corrupting force of political power and 
influence -- are available for inspection 
by state regulators and the concerned 
citizenry.  Financial disclosure functions 
not merely to subject private persons' 
finances to public scrutiny but as a 
means to deter those who might 
unethically capitalize on their political 
                                                 
136 Id. at 1134. 
137 Id. at 1136. 
138 898 F. 2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990). 
139 Id. at 877. 
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relationships.  Accountability follows 
publicity.140 
Similarly, in Slevin v. City of New York,141 the court upheld personal 
financial disclosure by city officials, candidates for city office, and city 
employees above a specified salary threshold.  Rejecting a privacy challenge 
to the disclosure requirements, the court stated that the city was 
"constitutionally free [to require disclosure], so long as in doing so it is seeking 
to achieve a proper objective through a defensible means.142  It continued: 
 
[T]he objectives sought by financial 
disclosure laws are in principle 
unassailable and theoretically justify a 
broad scope of inquiry.  Honest 
government is so patently a worthy 
objective, and the capacity for venality 
in human behavior is so profound and 
ingenious, that virtually any disclosure 
law however intrusive might be 
rationally justifiable.  Financial 
disclosure laws also derive 
considerable strength from the benefits 
widely felt to be derived from openness 
and from an informed public . . . .  The 
interest in an informed citizenry also 
supports a legislature's decision to 
adopt financial disclosure legislation.  
An informed public is essential to the 
nation's success, and a fundamental 
objective of the First Amendment.143 
                                                 
140 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 64-68(1976)). 
141 551 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
142 Id. at 922. 
143 Id. at 921.   See also Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(affirming Slevin in  relevant part and upholding the constitutionality of full public 
disclosure of the information).  In Barry, intermediate scrutiny was also applied to the 
litigants' claim that the law violated their rights under the equal protection clause, by 
burdening one class of public employees.  Id. at 1563; see also Eisenbund v. Suffolk 
County, 841 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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In County of Nevada v. MacMillan,144 the California Supreme Court 
upheld a financial disclosure statute redrafted after a previous version had 
been declared unconstitutional.  In noting the differences between the two 
statutes, the court stated: 
 
[T]he 1973 act appears to accomplish its 
legitimate aims in a less intrusive, and 
considerably more limited, fashion.  As noted 
above, the act's 'prohibition' provisions are 
keyed at enjoining only 'substantial’ conflicts of 
interest and relate only to public agency action 
or decision having a immaterial economic effect 
upon the official's economic interests.  Thus, 
the act does not forbid an official to participate 
in agency matters which could have only an 
insignificant, de minimus economic effect upon 
his interests.  More importantly, the act's 
'disclosure' provisions are aimed at requiring 
disclosure only if the official's interests could be 
'affected materially' by his public service.  
Moreover, unlike the 1969 act, the 1973 act 
does not require disclosure of the actual extent 
of the official's assets and interests, but only 
whether the value of his investment or real 
property interest exceeds $10,000 (and 
whether the aggregate value of income, loans 
and gifts during the year exceeded $1,000).  
Finally, the disclosure requirements of the 
1973 act apply only to certain specified high-
level officials and not to every public official 
throughout the state.  Disclosure of the 
economic interests of other public officials 
remains a subject for determination by the local 
boards and agencies involved.145 
The Alaska Supreme Court, in Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices 
Commission,146 found that state's financial disclosure law was unconstitutional 
because it would require that official, who also worked as a physician, to 
                                                 
144 522 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1974). 
145 Id. at 1350. 
146 570 P.2d 469 (Ak. 1977). 
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identify his patients.  The court determined that this violated the physician's 
and patient's privacy rights.147 
 
Disclosure Mandated by Courts or Legislative Investigations 
 
As discussed above, in NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court found 
that the NAACP was justified in withholding its membership lists from the State 
of Alabama.148  The State had obtained a court order requiring the production 
of this information as part of an action against the group for failing to qualify 
before doing business in Alabama.  The Court determined that the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to free association required that state efforts 
abridging these rights are subject to strict constitutionally scrutiny.149 
 
The Court concluded that the State could request some organizational 
information, including the identity of officials of the NAACP, but was forbidden 
by the Constitution from requiring the NAACP to provide a list of rank-and-file 
members, because the NAACP has demonstrated that "on past occasions 
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these 
members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, 
and other manifestations of public hostility."150 The Court observed that such 
an intrusive request was not justified by the State's specific interest here, which 
was to establish that the NAACP has been engaged in business in Alabama 
that required a corporate qualification filing.151 
 
Barenblatt v. United States152 considered the constitutional concerns of 
compelled disclosure in the course of  a congressional investigation.  There, 
the court said, "[T]he Congress, in common with all branches of the 
Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the 
Constitution on government action" in particular the Bill of Rights.  Not only 
does this abrogate the witnesses' civil rights, but "Congress may only 
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate.”153 
 
                                                 
147 Id. at 480. 
148 NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
149Id. at 452.  
150 Id. at 462. 
151 Id. at 460. 
152 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).  
153 Id. at 111. 
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In cases where witnesses have raised their First Amendment rights as a 
defense against a charge of contempt for failing to comply with a 
Congressional subpoena, the Court has applied a strict scrutiny balancing test. 
 
The First Amendment in some 
circumstances protects an individual 
from being compelled to disclose his 
associational relationships . . . . Where 
First Amendment rights are asserted to 
bar governmental interrogation 
resolution of the issue always involves 
a balancing test by the courts of the 
competing private and public interests 
at stake in the particular circumstances 
shown.154 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Committee held that 
balancing tests require that the state "convincingly show a substantial relation 
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling 
state interest."155  "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal 
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which 
is compelling."156 
 
In Gibson, the Court noted that this burden is more difficult for the 
government to carry when a witness is being questioned about the activities of 
others, than when he is asked about his own activities.  In Barenblatt, for 
example, the witness could be asked about his activities in the Communist 
Party, which the Court said "is not an ordinary or legitimate political party."157  In 
Gibson, the witness could not be queried about whether certain individuals 
(who were suspected Communists) were NAACP members. 
 
Congress must demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to 
overcome the individual's assertion of his First Amendment rights.158  In 
                                                 
154 Id. at 126. 
155 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); see 
also DeGregory v. New Hampshire Atty. Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966). 
156 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546 (quoting Bates v. Arkansas, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). 
157 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 547 (distinguishing Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959)).  
158 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 128 (citing Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-
66). 
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Barenblatt, the government was able to show a compelling governmental 
interest in obtaining information about the infiltration of Communists in 
American higher education due to the Party's avowed goal of overthrowing the 
U.S. Government, and the long-respected view that the Communist Party could 
not avail itself of the protections afforded an ordinary political party.159 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The standard of review applied is perhaps the most critical, and least 
consistent, aspect of the Court’s disclosure jurisprudence.  The exacting 
scrutiny standard set forth for disclosure by Buckley and NAACP v. Alabama 
usually is specified as the appropriate standard of review, but as a practical 
matter the Court is inconsistent in its application of the standard.  In McIntyre 
and ACLF the Court, while saying it is applying exacting scrutiny, appears to 
apply strict scrutiny, requiring statutes to be narrowly tailored – and non-
duplicative – to serve compelling state interests. 
 
The anti-corruption and anti-fraud interests enunciated in Buckley 
remain compelling to the Court.  But the informational interest is ripe for 
clarification by the Court.  It was dismissed in McIntyre and ACLF.  But, by 
contrast, the informational interest was found to be sufficiently compelling to 
enable litigants to have standing under the FECA in another recent case, FEC 
v. Aikens. 
 
The Court, in one of the arguably most consistent standards running 
throughout the disclosure case law, appears to give substantial weight to the 
extent to which a disclosure provision severely burdens or restricts speech.  
First, Buckley’s analysis, whereby courts analyze the reasonable probability 
that disclosure exposes persons to hostility, threats, harassment, or reprisal, 
was clearly articulated in Socialist Workers Party.  The “hostility” analysis also 
is apparent in McIntyre and ACLF.  More generally, the level of scrutiny applied 
in cases – whether termed exacting or strict scrutiny – appears to directly 
correlate to the severity of the burden imposed by the disclosure regulation.  
Thus, where the disclosure provision’s burden is perceived as heavy – as was 
the case in Socialist Workers, McIntyre, MCFL, etc. -- the statutes receive 
(and generally fail) severe scrutiny.  Where the disclosure provision is less 
burdensome, the standard is more lenient, and the provision is upheld, as in 
Buckley, Harriss, and RNC.160 
 
                                                 
159 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 128. 
160 The RNC was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.  RNC v. FEC, 117 S. Ct. 682 
(1997). 
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The narrow tailoring of disclosure provisions is a common theme 
throughout the case law.  Specifically, de minimus exceptions and low dollar 
thresholds, and temporal limitations are often required by the Court.  The 
Court, more specifically, has been especially protective of individuals, and 
small groups.  Thus in McIntyre, the Court protected Mrs. McIntyre, a lone 
individual of “modest” means, and in MCFL, a “small group” which engages in 
small “grassroots” activities.  In Socialist Workers, the Court noted the 
comparatively small budget and electoral success of the party.  In ACLF, the 
Court similarly, appears concerned about the lack of de minimus exceptions 
and thresholds of the circulator disclosure, which would expose persons to 
possible hostility, no matter how limited their  involvement, or how small their 
financial stake in the political activity. 
 
It is noteworthy that all of these cases were brought on behalf of 
judicially (if not politically) “sympathetic plaintiffs” – Mrs. McIntyre; a 
“grassroots” local pro-life group; and an unpopular “fringe” party.  By contrast, 
the Court has yet to strike a political disclosure provision claimed to burden a 
large and/or presumably politically powerful organization.  Consequently, the 
exceptions carved out may be more limited in application than they appear. 
 
Perhaps the least clear and most problematic requirement – if it is a 
requirement – is that disclosure employ the least restrictive alternative.  The 
Court’s disapproval of disclosure provisions that are duplicative, which 
appeared a significant factor in McIntyre and ACLF, threaten to inject 
substantial uncertainty on legislatures endeavoring to enact disclosure 
regimes.  The Court needs to clarify this part of their jurisprudence. 
 
The Court’s disclosure cases may often be less well explained by any 
coherent disclosure framework, however, than by the particular facts, and often 
the collateral legal issues presented, in a given case. For instance, in many of 
the above cases, the Court has reviewed disclosure statutes as well as other, 
related statutes.  In Buckley, the Court’s overall approval of the FECA’s 
purposes may explain its tendency to approve even the questionably low 
thresholds in the original Act.  In the ballot initiative or issue advocacy cases, 
the Supreme Court and lower courts’ disapproval of  disclosure may owe as 
much to the courts’ disapproval of contribution or spending limits imposed on 
the issue advocacy.  In ACLF, the analysis of the disclosure provisions may 
have been colored by the Court’s disapproval of Colorado statutes’ generalized 
disfavoring of professional ballot initiative campaigns.  These cases should be 
viewed in light of the overall statutory scheme reviewed, not merely the 
disclosure provisions.  Other important considerations include whether the 
disclosure statute is one of general application, as was not the case in ACLF, 
and whether the disclosure provision is content neutral or viewpoint neutral. 
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Finally, it must be said that the status of disclosure of issue advocacy 
remains as unresolved as the day Buckley was announced in 1976.  
Notwithstanding several lower courts’ formalistic application of express 
advocacy/issue advocacy, the Supreme Court, it should be remembered, did 
not strike the disclosure provisions, but rather applied narrowing constructions 
in order to leave intact at least a portion of the FECA disclosure regime.  In 
fact, analysis of disclosure provisions generally must begin with the recognition 
that the Court has addressed campaign disclosure per se in only four cases 
since Buckley:  Socialist Workers, MCFL, McIntyre, and ACLF, and of those, 
MCFL and ACLF disclosure was only one of several issues.   
 
Further, only in one case – Socialist Workers, with its exceptional facts 
– did the Court permit candidate-specific activities to occur without any public 
disclosure .  In MCFL, the other case involving candidate-specific speech, the 
Court held that the organization did not need to register as a political 
committee because the organization was so small, accepted no corporate 
funds, and was not principally organized for political purposes.  However, the 
Court still required MCFL to file reports with the FEC of all independent 
expenditures over $200 with the FEC.161 
 
Nonetheless, that all four of these cases either disapproved the 
disclosure provision at issue or imposed an exception or exemption from 
existing disclosure provisions indicates that the overall trend in disclosure 
cases has been skepticism towards the pro-disclosure framework enunciated in 
Buckley.  And yet, the Buckley framework – which was undeniably favorable 
towards disclosure – still remains the controlling precedent and constitutional 
analytic.  Like many constitutional questions concerning campaign finance, 
then, answers are more likely to be announced in the future, than culled from 
the past. 
 
Based on the jurisprudential framework in place at this point, though, it 
seems clear that the Court will look more favorably on disclosure of candidate-
specific activity by larger organizations than on referenda/ballot issue speech 
by individual local activists like Mrs. McIntyre.  Further, the Court will prefer less 
intrusive forms of disclosure – of only large contributors, with a minimum of 
administrative burden, and where there is no evidence that serious threats, 
harassment, or reprisals will result.  Within these boundaries, the Court will still 
look at the substantial state interest, and evidence that the required disclosure 
                                                 
161 The FECA requires disclosure of all independent expenditures (communications 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate) of more than $250 a year, 
and the identification of each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the 
person or organization filing such statement which was made for the purpose of 
furthering the independent expenditure.  2 U.S.C. § 434(c). 
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advances the legitimate government interests of preventing corruption and 
fraud, and providing information to voters. 
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